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FRENCH DISSIDENTS
By PAUL.FRANVOIS CARCOPINO
Since ollr last. article 011 the FrellcJ. Itituation (ll!arch 1943). which earned
the Ittory up to the CJltsa....i'wlion oj Darlan on Chn.,llmatl Eve 1942. the French d...·
Itident movemwt /l(JJJ been drawn completely into tM vortex of power politi.c8. Hence
the contradictiona exisl'iILrJ amo1lrJ vanou8 jacti01ul oj the diaside,.J.. have been mul·
tiplied IJ.!I the intrigues of Washington, London. and Moltcow. 7'1Ie altenwting neuJlt
about allerJed reconciliations and fresh quarrels between the di..sidellt leaders and
the coming and going oj their supporters finally became ItO confused that moltt people
abandoned the effort of keeping up with eVe1II.,. On tM ba.<ris of all material available
here. our Fretlch collaborator has ,ww prepared an analysil1 of the developmenlB in
t.he d'8sident camp for the pClltt twelt'e mOtlJ"".-K.M.
DARLAN'S LAST WILL
SHORTLY before he was assassinated,Darlan made a statement over theradio which has since become known
as his "last will" and in which he ex-
plained his own position. The Admiral
took great pains to point out that he
was not a rebel opposed to Marshal Petain
but was acting on the Marshal's behalf.
He claimed that Marshal Petain had
become a prisoner of the Germans when
they marched into unoccupied France
following the Anglo-American invasion of
French North Africa, and he called him-
self "the trustee of the legal powers of
France." Darlan said: "We do not in-
tend to form a government in North
Africa. I simply represent the interests
of France in North Africa in the name of
the Marshal who is a prisoner of the
Germa.ns. "
To the French mind the question of
legality has always been important.
Therefore it might have been of the
utmost consequence for the further course
of events if Darlan's theory had been
generally accepted. Two facts, however,
interfered with his plan. In the first
place, Marshal Petain himself, instead of
declaring himself a prisoner of the Ger-
mans, clearly disavowed the Admiral on
November 14, 1942, that is, as soon as
the latter's treason became certain, and
thus denuded Darlan of every pretence
of acting in his name. In the second
place, the Allies were not in agreement
in their attitude toward Darlan. While
Washington showed willingness to co-
operate with him, England had its own
pretender to the leadership of the French
dissident forees in the person of General
Charles de Gaulle, while in Moacow's
eyes Darlan remained a "Fascist."
On December 24, 1942, the problem
of Darlan was eliminated by his assas-
sination; but the conflicts between the
French di88idents and the Allies remained.
The first to take up where Darlan had
been interrupted was General Henri
Honore Giraud. (Giraud was at this
moment in North Africa after breaking
his pledged word to the Germans and to
the Marshal, while de Gaulle was still in
London.) For Giraud there was no longer
any possibility of pretending that he
possessed the legality which Darlan had
still claimed for himself. Bnt, as a
general, Giraud did not care much about
politics. One of his first actions was the
transformation of Darlan's "Empire Coun-
cil" into a simple "War Committee,"
also in Algiers. He believed that it was
enough to have a common aim-that of
fighting against the Axis-to unite all
dissident forces.
But there were many political con-
troversies of a domestic nature to be
taken care of. In North Africa alone-
not to mention the other French poeses-
sions under di88ident rule-there are at
least three clea.r divisions among the
population: French, Arabs, and Jews.
FRENCH . DISSIDENTS 43
In addition there were the difficulties
arising from the presence of large foreign
armies and from the scarcity of food and
8upplie!". It sooms that General Giraud
hoped to overcome these difficulties and
to ma.intain order simply by continuing
to employ the laws of Vichy and the
men whom the Marshal had entrusted
with the a~lministration of North Africa
-(:cncra,l NOgUl~S in Morocco and Gov-
ernor General Boisson in French Wcst
Africa. ~t. Peyrouton he mado Gov-
em()r (:l'lIel'lll o"f Algeria and a member
of the War Committee.
TIH~ MEN llEHI!'\D GIHAUD
III 1U36 AbC'1 Peyrouton was Res-
ident General of Morocco. As he was
frequently accused of having authoritarian
and Fascist inclinations, Blum's Popular
Front Cabinet transferred him in Sep-
tember 1936 to the post of French Am-
bal· ador to Argentina, replacing him in
Morocco by Genera,l Nogues.
J\ftor the coUapse of France the Mar-
shal rccaUed him from Buenos Aires and
made him Vice-Minister, later Minister,
(}f Intental Affairs. But it sooms that
from the start Peyrouton was opposed to
the Marshal's policy of collaboration
wit,h l:ermany. He W80S a bitter enemy
of Laval ~Llld responsible for the latter's
dismil'sal on December 14, 1941. Upon
Laval's return to power he resigned and
returned to Ruenos Aires. It was only
a£t~r the a..,sassination of Darlan that
Pl'}Touton went to North Africa.
Apart from Peyrouton and his military
colleagues, the men behind Giraud were
mainly leading capitalists. Among them
we havc heard dw names of Rene Mayor
(nephew of the Rothsehilds of Paris,
repre~entativc of Jewish high finance,
und agent of the Laza.rd banking group)
<Lilli LtJllla,igre-Dubreuil, who some years
elLrlier had headed the French Employ-
ers' Organization. Another important
politicnl group in France linked with the
dissidents consists of men close to Colonel
de la Roque's "Social Party." For some
timc it seemed as if they were supporting
Marshal Petain; but when they realized
thn t t he Marshal was sincere in his policy
of collaboration, and particularly after
Laval"s return to power and the Da.rlan
affair of November 1942, they turned
more and more in favor of the dissident.'!.
RELUCTANT HANDSHAKE
The most important inner-political
question, which Giraud could not ignore
in the long run. was the clarification of
his rela.tions with Geneml de Ga.uUe, who
had headed most of the di..QSidents before
Darlan and Giraud had appeared in
North Africa. From t.he start a sharp
conflict existed between Gira.ud and
de Gaulle. The War Committee itself
wu.s composed ulmost entirely of men
who had not long ago pledged allegiance
to Marshal Petain arlll more or less
approved the domestic policy of the
Marshal's national rcvolution. Quite
apart from persona.l ambition and enmity,
this fact alone made it impossible for de
Gaulle to submit himself to the War
Committee, as he had always most
severely criticized not only the Marshal's
collaboration with Germany but albo his
interna.l policy. The efforts of the Ameri-
can Commander in Chief, General Dwight
Eisenhower, to reconcile aU French dis-
sidents faced great difficulties. Even the
theatrical handshake of Giraud and de
Gaulle during tho Casablanca Conierenco
in January 1943 did not settle the
question.
As time went on, the political problems
in the dissident camp became more prOBS-
ing and could no longer be overlooked.
For the sake of unity, General Giraud,
who wished to concentrate his energietl
on military questions, began to com-
promise here and there with de Gaulle.
He abandoned some of Vichy's &uthor-
itarian laws, such as the laws about the
Jews, and he freed political prisoners-
former Communist deputieB. Red Span-
iards, and variouR anti-Vichy elements.
Finally, on June 3, 1943, he mergod his
War Committee with de Gaune's organiza-
tion "Fighting France" into the "Com-
mittee of National Liberation." With
every concession he made, Giraud opened
the gate of North Africa a little wider to
de Ga.uUe and his followers; yet the ten-
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sian botween the two leaders did not
diminish.
CHARLES DE GAULLE
From the "Free French" via "Fighting
Fmnce" to the "Committee of National
Liberation"; from the desire to continue
tho war against GerUl1Lny at the side of
England via mercenary service to England
to the recent submission to Moscow-
can we find some explanation for theBe
ceaseleBs changes in the policy of de
Gaulle?
If the "Free French" had fought on
the battlefield against the Germans, any-
one would have considered the sacrifice
of their lives a guarantee of their sincer-
ity, no matter what he may have thought
about the political views of their leaders.
But the fight against tho Germans hardly
ever materialized. From the days of
Oran and Dakar (July and September
1940), de Gaulle's ":Free French" fought
almost exclusively against other French-
men and for the benefit of England, To
be sure, England had promised de Gaulle
the restoration of France and her colonial
empire after the end of the war; but
after the Atlantic Charter and the con-
ferences of Casablanca, Moscow, and
Teheran, not much has been left of this
promise. The development has gone far
beyond those early conversations botween
Churchill and de Gaulle in 1940, and it is
a long time since anybody on the Anglo-
American side mentioned the restomtion
of the French Empire,
When, under the constant pressure of
General Eisenhower and public ·opinion
in America. llud England, Giraud and de
Gaulle finally reached some semblance of
co-operation, they both still realized that,
as far aa the world waa concerned, they
did not represent much more than their
own bands of followers. This is why
they have tried ince88antly to obtain
the status of a recognized government.
NO RECOGNITION
The question of recognition of the
Committee of Nationnl Liberation has
been discussed in the newspapers over
and over again, Finally, on August 27 ~
1943, Great Brita.in, the United States,
and the USSR defined their attitudes
towa.rd the Committee of National Libera-
tion in Algiers--each in its own way.
The British note states that it regards
the Committee as an institution "which
is able to safeguard t.he directiun of
French war efforts wit,hin the framework
of inter-Allied co-operat,ion." Thu". in
the eyes of the British, the Committee is
not an organ lawfully representing }'rance,
nor an exile government.. but merely an
instrument of the Allied war effort. To
make this quite clear, the note declares
that there can be no que!;tion of an
exchange of diplomatic representatives
between the Committee and the British
Government. M. Vienot, once a mem-
ber of a Blum cabinet, whom t.he Com-
mittee had sent to London, is neither an
ambassador nor a minister but merely
an agent; while the British repre:;entative
in Algiers MacMillan bore the title of
"Minister Resident," the customary title
for the representative of a great power
in a state without sovereignty, until he
was replaced by Duff-Cooper on November·
22. This attitude of London places the
Committee of National Libention on a
lower Jevel than Egypt who, at least
outwardly, is recognized as sovereign
by London.
,Tust as unsatisfactory is the wording
of Washington's note, which read' :
The Govcrnment of the United States takos note
with sympathy of the r1esire of the Committe<> 1,0
be regarded as the body qualified tu Oll.iure the
administration and defense of Frenclt inleresL8.
The extent to which it, may be pos.qible t,o give
effect to this desire must, however, be reserved for
conaideratioll in each CIL8<l as it aM808.
On these understandings, the Government of
the United States recognizes tht! French Com.
mittee of National Liberation 88 administering
th080 French overseas territories which acknowl-
edge its authority. Thia statement does not
constitute a recognition of a government of France
or of the French empire b)' the GoYcrnment of
the United States.
Thus, as far as the governments of
London and \\'ashington are concerned,
the Committee does not represent the
French nation-in contrast to their at-
titude toward the refugee governments
of Poland, Norway, and others-but is-
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merely a body with very limited ad-
ministrative functioDB.
The Anglo-Americans' attitude is easy
to understand. They want North
Africa o.s a base for their war against
Europe. They need its man power, ports,
grain, phOf,phatcs, ore, railways, and they
wish to keep their hands completely free
in order to deal with the :Frenoh colonial
empire at their own will and without
being bothered by any considerations for
a French governmental body.
THE SOVlETS GO THEm OWN WAY
The Soviet note of August 27 is quite
different. It reads in full :
The Government of the Soviet l nion, after
becomin~ "('(Iu"intod wilh the declarntioll of the
}o'renl'h Committee of National Liberation, has
decided to recognize the French Committee of
National Liberation as the repreeontative of the
f1tat~ inter6flt8 of the }o'rench Republio and as the
leader of aU Frenoh patriotll who fight. against
Hitler tynumy and t.o exchange ropreeontativ68
with full powera.
Moscow hilS very cleverly used the
situation for it own purposes. While
London and \\'ashington have refused
recognition, Moscow, in extending full
recognition, has made up for its lack of
military power in North Africa by firm
diplumat ie ties with Algiers. The Soviets
immediately dispatched Hogomolov to
Algiers as an ambassador. This choice
i significant. Prior to his appointment
to Algiers, Bogomolov was Soviet Am-
bas<;ador to the refugee government· of
Gree 'C, Norway, Yugoslavia, /l.nd zecho-
slovakia in London. By tran ferring him
to Algiers wit.hout appointing a su 'cessor
in London, Moscow has clearly shown
that it has far higher regard for Algiers
than for the London-supported refugee
go\'€'rnment':l, exactly the opposite at-
titude to that of Great Britain. \\ e can
be nre that the Smiet Union will utilize
its diploll111ti' relatioDBhip with Algiers
to the be. t advantage. Before the end
of August, sixty Soviet "commercial rep-
resentatives" urrived in Algiers to be
attached to various Soviet trade com-
mis~ions.
TilE LEBANON REVOLTS
The nonrecognition of the Committee
of National Liberation by the Anglo-
Amcrican.~ has had many sad onsequenc-
es for that body. Time and again the
Committee ho.s complained thll.t it was
,not invited to participate in nny of the
important Allied conferences-aH, for in-
stance, those in Moscow, Cairo, and
Teheran-that it ho.s no seat in the
Allied Advisorv Council in London, and
that it was not allowed to participate in
the armistice negotiatioDB with Badoglio,
although in all these cases Fronch in-
tere8Ul were affected.
In Novomber 1943, M. Helleu who, in
the name of the Committee of National
Liberation, was High Commissioner for
tho Republic of Lebanon, arrested the
President as well as the Chief of
Government of Lebanon, because they
had proclaimed the independence of tbeir
state and tho abolition of the French
mandate. This step of tho Lebanese
sta~men was the result of promises of
liberation and independence for the
Lebanon wllich the dissidents had made
when they conquered tho Lebanon and
Syria from the Vichy authorities. A rev-
olution broke out in the Lebanon. Even
General Catroux (de Ga.ullist predec08Sor
of HeUeu and former de (,aullist Governor
Geneml of French Indo-China, a close
friend of the English, and probably a
better Jiplomat tban most other ex-
genern.ls among the dissidents) wo.s unable
to calm tho Lebanon when he was sent
there. Although the Committ,ee of Na-
tional Liberation had publicly claimed
that Hcllcu had only obeyed it.~ orders,
Catroux was unable to find any solution
to tho oonflict except by discard-
ing Helleu and releasing the Lebanese
leader..
This cw'o again showed the importance
of legality. Thc Committee of 'ational
Liberation has no claim on. )Tia and
the Lebanon because it docs not represent
France, to whom these states were given
as mandatel:l by the League of Nations.
The British cleverly turned this to their
own advantage by taking the side of
the yrians and Lebanese, thus harm-
ing French pre tige in the Near East
and replacing French power by their
own.
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THE LEGALITY OF VICHY
In contrast to the dissidents, the
Government at Vichy is a government
both in name and in fact. Laval in
particular has always been aware of the
importance of legality and has strictly
adhered to it, even when this was most
inconvenient. When on July 10, 1940,
Laval obtained legal powers for the Mar-
shal from the National Assembly, almost
all the members of tho assembly were
sons of the Third Republic. Being even
at that moment traditionally unwilling
to yield their righta to ono man, they
put various restrictions on his powers.
To observe these restrictions scrupulously
and to keep the promises made, even
those made by former French govern-
ments, has been the policy of the Marshal
and of Laval in order not to give their
enemies any justified grounds for attack-
ing the legality of their government..
This is the reason why the Government
has remained in Vichy instead of return-
ing to Paris. thereby keeping intact the
status resulting from the Armistice of June
1940. (The part of France not occupied
before Novem bel' 1942 is still considered
legally unoccupied territory, as the entry of
German troops after the Anglo-American
invasion of North Mrica was not an
"occupation" but an action for the de-
fense of the coast of southern France.)
This is the reason why the French
Fleet scuttled itself at Toulon in Novem-
ber 1942. (The Government thereby
combined its obligation resulting from the
Armistice, i.e., not to give the Navy to
the British, and its pledge to the British
Government made in Jtme 1940, i.e., not
to hand the fleet over to the Germans.)
This is, finally, one of the reasons why no
peace has been signed between the Vichy
Government and Germany. (The pre-
vious French Government had promised
its ally England not to conclude a separate
peace.)
As a result of this careful policy, Laval's
government has a clear legal basis. Even
today, with German troops in all parts
of France and with large numbers of
young Frenchmen in Germany as workers
or prisoners of war, the Allies still {ear
the Vichy Government, as it is the only
legal government for forty millioll French-
men. Allied radios are trying their ut-
most to incite the French against tills
Government. They warn them that
French towns and industrial plants will
be destroyed if the French people do not
rise against the Germans; and day after
day Allied bombs fall 011 French ter-
ritory, killing and wounding thousands of
French civilians.
}o'ROM ROY.UlSM TO BOLSHEvrSM
How different is the situation of de
Gaulle. He has broken with all prin-
ciples of law and order. He has lost his
citizenship. He is in the pay of tho
British. (Even though the money comes
from the riches which the AllicR have
taken frum the French, de Ga.ulle must
obey the orders of thol"e who control it.)
If one of hiR followers dues something
which displeases the British or Americans,
de Gaulle is forced to disavow him.
This happened, fur example, in the case
of Hellcu in the revolt of the Lebanon.
The absence of recognition, his fight
with Giraud, and the necessity of main-
taining his position against the swannI'!
of politicians whom defeat had thrown
out of France and who do not wish to
be forgotten-all this has forced de Gaulle
to look for any support he might be able
to find. In order to avoid complete
dependence on Britain, t.o get rid of
American-supported Giraud and the cx-
Vichy politicians, and to win new sup-
porters for himself, de Gaulle threw him-
self into the arms of the Reds. The law
of September 1, 1939, banning the
Communist Party and all commwlist
political organizations frOUl French ter-
ritory, was revoked on June :!5. llH3.
Twenty-six Communist deputies were
released from prison. A large number
of Communist organizations were per-
mitted, such as the Communist Party,
the Communist "Fighting League, the
Union of Syndicates, the Committee of
Socialist Action, the League for Human
Rights, the Society for French-Suviet
Rapprochement, etc. CUllllllUrW t in-
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fluence has risen enormously. On No-
vember I, Communist demonstrut,ors in
Algiers demanded the proclamation of
an Algerian ~ovict Republic.
The road of de C:aulle is one more proof
that thero i::l no longer any intcrmcdilLte
solution for Europe and that the choice
iB only he tween a (~erman ,·ie·tory or a
Bolshevist Europe.
EOLIPSE OF GIRAUD
At the same time de Gaulle has forced
many of Giraud's partisans-such as
Peyrouton and Nogues--out of office.
The result is that there is now nobody
left in r\urth Africa willing or able to
fight the BoIsheyist influence. All new
vacancies provide opportunities for de
Caulle to reward his henchmen and to
strengthen hiB prestige among them by
making colonels into generals and
small unknown officials into governors
general.
All this has strengthened the inner-
political position of de Gaulle to such an
extent. that Uiraud has been increasingly
eclipsed. In the last days of July, the
dualism in the leadership of the Com-
mittee of N[ttional Liberation came to
an end, when it was agreed that de Caulle
was hencefort.h to take care of all political
questions, while the domain of Giraud
was to be limit.ed to the command of the
military formations of the dissidents.
This, however, led to new conflicts wh.ich
reached their climax during the occupation
of Corsica. Giraud, claiming supreme
command of the troops, sent some dis-
sident formatiolls to the i::lland without
asking de Gaulle for permission, the latter
only learning about this action through
the Briti. h radio. Toward the end of
September the new post of "Defense
Commissioner" was created and given to
General Le Gentilhomme, who thus be-
came Giraud'a superior. And a month
later, on October 26. Giraud's powers
were further curtailed when his military
authority was limited to Corsica and
the ports of Algiers, Bone, and Bizerta,
the rest being placed under Le Gen-
tilhomme.
CARICATURE OF A PARLIAMENT
Parallel to the gradual elimination of
Giraud, the originally authoritarian regime
of Darlan and Giraud had to be replaced
fOI' the sake of appearances. A"Provi-
sional Advisory Assembly" was estab-
lished by the end of September. at first
wit h t went.y IIIem bers, viz., 5 Socialists,
5 Radical f;ocialists, :3 Communists, and
7 CentristI'. whjch latter include the
rightists. Later this number was in-
creased until the Assembly became a
miniature caricature of the old French
Chamber of Deputies. Needless to say,
the Assembly has little actual power, as
all important decisions are made by the
Anglo-American occupation authorities.
To chamcterize the type of men prom-
inent ill Algiers we ~hall name a few;
Mendes-France was a fonner Under-
secretary of State for the Treasury in
the second Blum Cabinet. With his
own funds safely in Egyptian pounds in
Alexandria. he was responsible in 1937
for the prohibition of transferring fun&
abroad and worked for the devaluation
of the franc. ] n May 1941 he was con-
demned to six years' imprisonment for
desertion, u."l he had left France in July
1940 while still a soldier. Both he, who
is a Commissioner of Finance in the
Committee of National Liberation, and
M. Diethelm, Commissioner for Stores and
Supplies, are Jewish.
Pierre Cot was Minist,er of Aviation in
various French cabinets, especially those
of Daladier. After the collapse of France
he was accused of having neglected the
preparation of her national defense.
Having fled from France, he lectured at
Harvard University ~ His pro-Soviet in-
clinations are of long standing.
_"ndre Marty has been known for many
decadeR as a radical Communist leader in
France. He made a notorious name for
himself during the Spanish Civil War.
The leading Communist in Algiers, he iB
one of the most important men there.
He is loud in demanding the arrest of
Giraud, whom he considers a Fascist.
Another Communist is in charge of the
"Office of Purification" and will booome
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All these divergencies of opinion and
this confusion of mind show that the
French are still unable to achieve the
moral and political unity so necessary
very important in this position as soon
BoB the trials start which have been an-
nounced for Peyrouton, Boisson, Nogues,
Flandin, and othcr prominent men.
Needless to say, the Communists are
not interested in helping de Gaulle. 'rhey
are cleverly exploiting the situation in
North Africa and the prevailing mental
confusion among the French people to
prepare their way to power. They are
trying to make use of the discontent of
the Arabs by proposing the creation of
a free state or something similar, and of
the Jews by spreading Communist ideas
among them and by scaring them with
the consequences of an Axis victory.
Will they also be able to win the
French? This should be more difficult.
The di88idents' situation is almost a rep-
etition of that under tho Popular Front
regime. Even if we agree with Marshal
P6tain that the French people have a
short memory, we cannot but hope that
they still remember the reasons for the
-collapse of 1940.
France has recently been told by Prime
Minister Smuts of South Africa what she
has to expect from her former ally Eng-
land. On November 25, 1943, while
taking Churchill's place in Lonuon during
the latter's absence, Smuts declared:
"We ma.y talk of France as 8 great power, but
talking will not help her much. .France bWl gone
and wiJl be gOlle in our day and perha.ps for many
a dny."
• • •
for the rebirth of France. But we should
not base our conclusions as to France's
future only on the facts mentioned in
this article and to be found in the dis-
sidents' camp. There are four other
facts of which the world hears little
and which in the end are likely to be
of more consequence:
(1) The living and working of hundreds
of thousands of French laborers in Ger-
many for three-and-a-half years. This
has given them and the Germallil an
opportunity to get to know and under-
stand each other better than ever
before.
(2) The mistakes made by the British
and their American allies. They were
frequently misled by their dissident
advisers, who were motivated primarily
by hatred for Germany and the new
regime in France and who only thought
of what they themselves had lost. But
hatred is a bad adviser, and a strong
anti-British feeling is growing among
those who have had to pay for England's
policy.
(3) The contrast between the actions
of Germany who, for example, allowed
the French to reoccupy Savoy and Nice
after the surrender of Badoglio, and the
Anglo-American grabbing of the French
colonial empire.
(4) The fact that almost four years of
dissidenco have led to nothing better
than to the return of those men and
ideas that failed to settle the problems
arising after the Great War and to whom
few Frenchmen would wish to entrust
their destiny again.
Once bitten . ..
Danton, the overthrown leader of the French Revolution, had
been condemned to death and was being taken to the guillotine in
a tumbrel. With a bitter smile he turned away from the screaming
mob and said to his companion Chabot:
.. One thing I'm sure of: if there ever should be a revolution in
heaven, we'll keep out of it I"
